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Civilians Often Need Protection From the Police:
Let's Handcuff Police Brutality
The most effective way to deter police brutality, like
the alleged assault on Haitian immigrant Abner
Louima, is for city officials to repeatedly remind its
38,000 police officers that unnecessary violence will
not be tolerated ... Delivering a message ... is very
important... What you try to do is set the proper tone
and to make it clear that actions of a certain kind will
not be tolerated.'

I. INTRODUCTION

The recent brutalization of Abner Louima by New York City
police officers and the reticence of the officers and supervisors, both
during and immediately after this incident, has caused public outrage. 2
Despite this outrage, police violence occurs in the city with alarming
regularity.
Although there has been a drastic drop in crime in New York
since 1992, many people believe they are less safe now than they were
then.4 Many argue that while incidents of serious crime in New York
have decreased, civil rights abuses by police officers has been the
consequence that some individuals must contend with. 5 From 1993 to
1995, civilian complaints filed against police officers for excessive
force increased by 61.9 percent. 6 In the same period, allegations of
police abuse of authority have increased by 86.2 percent, and
allegations of illegal searches rose by 135 percent. 7 The recent
' See Matthew Goldstein, Mollen Praises Mayor's Response to Assault by
Police, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 4, 1997, at I (quoting Milton Mollen, former state judge and
chairman to the Commission that investigated police corruption).
2 David Dinkins, Giuliani Time: What the Mayor Must Do about Police
Brutality,VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 26, 1997, at 34.
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See Claude Lewis, Crime is Down in New York but is Police Abuse the
Price to Pay, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 8, 1997, at 6A.
6 See Dinkins, supra note 2, at 34.
7 See Dinkins, supra note 2, at 34.
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incident against Abner Louima,. although
extreme, is the latest high
8
profile example of police brutality.
This Note focuses on police brutality and its impact on the
civil rights of victims in the United States. It concludes that criminal
and civil law remedies are ineffective in deterring police brutality and
thus fail to adequately protect victims' civil rights. It proposes the
need to develop a review board, independent of the police department,
in order to properly monitor and investigate complaints against police
officers. Further, this Note proposes changes to the current statutory
elements and remedies for police brutality to ensure that victims' civil
rights are provided more protection.
The second section of this note defines police brutality? The
third section describes the causes of police brutality, focusing on
racism and its effects on police conduct.' 0 It also concentrates on
police practices and the effect of the police culture on officers.']
Section four addresses criminal law remedies for victims. 2 The fifth
section, focusing on the prosecutor's discretion and obstacles in
litigation, addresses why criminal remedies fail to deter police
brutality.' 3 The sixth section concentrates on victims' civil law
remedies.' 4 The seventh section focuses on why civil law remedies
fail to deter police brutality.' 5 The eighth section concentrates on
civilian complaint review boards.' 6 The ninth section addresses police
reform, focusing on the Mollen Commission of New York and
reforming criminal and civil statutes.1 7 Finally, this Note concentrates
on actions that need to be taken in the future to deter
police brutality
8
and provide more protection to victims' civil rights.'
8 See Dinkins, supra note 2, at 34.
9 See infra pp. 6-8.
1oSee infra pp. 8-11.

"See infra pp. 11-14.
'2 See infra pp. 15-18.
13See infra pp. 19-22.
14See infra pp. 22-3 1.
"5See infra pp. 31-34.
16 See infra pp. 34-36.

17See infra pp. 36-38.
" See infra pp. 38-39.
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A. The Abner Louima Incident- The Facts
According to police and prosecutors, the following sequence
of events occurred and led to the arrests of four police officers.' 9 On
Saturday, August 9, 1997, at 4:00 a.m., the police received a call from
a club in Brooklyn about a fight that had ensued between two women
after closing. 20 Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant, tried to break up
the fight and was drawn into it. 21 In response to the call, at least five
police officers arrived at the club.22
A physical confrontation
into police custody. 23
taken
being
Louima
in
resulted
which
followed,
At 4:30 a.m., Police Officers Thomas Bruder, Thomas Wiese, Justin
Volpe and Charles Schwartz, stopped their patrol car and allegedly
beat Louima using their fists and a police radio. 24 At 4:40 a.m., the
police officers allegedly stopped the car again. 25 However, this time,
only Bruder and Wiese allegedly performed the beating.2 6
Police Officers Schwarz and Wiese brought Louima to the
station house where they told Louima they *were searching for
contraband and lowered his pants. 27 Schwarz then took Louima into
the bathroom and Volpe followed with a pair of gloves. 28 Volpe then
allegedly took out a stick, which was approximately two to three feet
long, sodomized Louima and then placed the stick in Louima's mouth,
breaking some of his teeth.29 Volpe then took Louima, with his pants

19Chronology of Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug.
21, 1997, at A32.
20

Id.

21 id.

22 id
23 Id.

24 Chronology of Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, supra note
25Chronologyof Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, supra note
26Chronology of Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, supra note
27 Chronologyof Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, supra note
28 Chronology of Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, supra note
29Chronologyof Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, supra note

9, at
9, at
9, at
9, at
9, at
9, at

A32.
A32.
A32.
A32.
A32.
A32.
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People in the station saw Volpe

Over an hour later, a call was placed from the police station to
the Fire Department requesting an ambulance. 32 Louima was taken to
33

the hospital where he was classified as being in critical condition.

He suffered tears to his lower intestine, a punctured bladder, broken

teeth, lacerations and bruising consistent with a beating. 34 In the
hospital, a nurse reported the incident to the Police Department's

Internal Affairs Bureau. 35 The investigation, however, did not begin
36
until 36 hours later.
The charges against Louima were dropped, but the case

against the police officers involved in this action has just begun.37
The Brooklyn District Attorney's office filed a grand jury indictment
against the four officers claiming that they brutalized Louima because
of his race. 38 The indictment consists of three counts of seconddegree aggravated harassment against the four police officers. 39 In
addition to these charges, Volpe and Schwarz have also been charged
30Chronology of Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, supra note 9, at A32.
31See id; see also Lewis, supra note 5, at 6A. Louima stated that during the
attack, two of the officers said, "This is Giuliani time, not Dinkins time." Id. This was
referring to the fact that-New York now has a white mayor, rather than the former mayor
who was black. Id; Christopher John Farley, A Beating in Brooklyn; New York's Finest
Come Under Fire After a Haitian Man is Sexually Assaulted, Allegedly by Cops, TIME,
Aug. 25, 1997, at 38 (noting that Louima also claims that the officers said, "[w]e're going
to teach niggers to respect police officers.").
32Chronology of Events in Brooklyn Torture Case, supra note 9, at A32.
33 See Susan Ferraro, Haunted by Memories Psyche's Scars Last to Heal,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 25, 1997, at 6.
34 id.

35 See Edward Lewis, Policing the Police, ESSENCE, Nov., 1997, at 14.
36 id.

37 Farley, supra note 21, at 38.
38 See Patricia Hurtado & Leonard Levitt, A Matter of Race/DA Brings New
Indictment in the 70'4 Precinct Case, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 22, 1997, at A3.
39 See id; see also 2 More Officers Arrested in Sodomy Attack; The Case
Widens as the Justice Department Announces that it Will Investigate the New York City
Police Department for a Pattern of Tolerating Brutality, STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 19, 1997, at
4A (noting that two civilian complaints of excessive force were filed against police
officer Wiese in 1991 and 1994 and that police officer Bruder also had two force
complaints filed against him in 1995).
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with assault, aggravated sexual abuse, and possession of an illegal
weapon.

II. THE DEFINITION OF POLICE BRUTALITY
"As long as some members of society do not comply with law
and resist the police, force will remain an inevitable part of
policing." 4 1 People, therefore, should not be surprised or offended if
police use force occasionally on the job.4 2 Sometimes, however, it
becomes difficult to differentiate between a legitimate and an
excessive amount of force. 43 The acquittals in the state prosecution of
Police Officers Laurence Powell, Theordore Briseno, Stacey Koon
and Timothy Wind in the Rodney King case 44 illustrate that even the
most obvious cases of abuse are not apparent to everyone.4 5 Numerous
criminologists and other academic researchers differentiate between
force that is necessary46 to complete the job as authorized, as opposed
to unauthorized force.
A practical way to understand this continuum is to focus on
the abuse of police authority.47 Abuse of police authority has been
defined as "any action by a police officer without regard to motive,
intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, trespass upon human
dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent
legal right of a member of the police constituency in the course of
40

Hurtado & Levitt, supra note 28, at A3.

41 See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE &
THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 37
42 Id.

(1993).

43 See Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of
Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 684 (1996); see also
SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 41, at 13 (discussing the written rule is that "cops are to
use no more force than necessary to subdue a suspect" in a department subculture
supporting brutality the unwritten rule is "[t]each them a lesson").
44 Powell v. Superior Court, 232 Cal. App. 3d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(acquitting the police officers involved in the Rodney King beating despite the fact that it
had been videotaped).
45 Freeman, supra note 43, at 684-85.
46 Freeman, supra note 43, at 685.
47 Freeman, supra note 43, at 685.
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performing police work. 48 The abuse of police power can be
physical, psychological or legal.4 9 When a police officer physically
abuses someone, he or she uses "more force than is necessary to effect
a lawful arrest or search, and/or the wanton use of any degrees of
physical force against another by a police officer under the color of
the officer's authority." 50 A police officer psychologically abuses
another when he or she "verbally assails, ridicules, discriminates, or
harasses individuals and/or places a person who is under the actual or
constructive dominion of the officer in a situation [where] the
individual's esteem or self image are threatened or diminished."5512
Legal abuse usually occurs without physical or psychological abuse.
It is the "violation of a person's constitutional,
federally protected, or
53
state-protected rights by a police officer."
The rationale for supporting the expansion of the concept of
police brutality to include physical, psychological, and legal abuse is
that the expansion more precisely includes the experiences that
victims have with the police. 4 By thinking of police brutality in these
terms, police departments will benefit
when they are working to
55
relations.
improve police/community

48 Freeman, supra note 43, at 685; see also Thomas Barker & David L.
Carter, A Typology of Police Deviance, in POLICE DEVIANCE 4, 7 (Thomas Barker &
David L. Carter eds., 1991).
49Freeman, supra note 43, at 685.
50Freeman, supra note 43, at 685.
51Freeman, supra note 43, at 685-86.

52Freeman, supra note 43, at 686.
53Freeman, supra note 43, at 686.
54Freeman, supra note 43, at 686; see also Barker & Carter, supra note 48, at

198 (stating that the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice classified brutality as "the use of excessive force, name-calling, sarcasm,
ridicule, and disrespect."); SKOLNICK& FYFE,supra note 41, at 19 (defining brutality as a
"conscious and venal act committed by officers who usually take great pains to conceal
their misconduct").
55See Freeman, supra note 43, at 686.
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III. CAUSES OF POLICE BRUTALITY
A. Racism
Police brutality incidents occur against minorities in numbers
disproportionate to their representation in the overall population. 56 It
is difficult to determine why minorities are disproportionately the
targets, as statistics involving police brutality and minorities are
difficult to determine. Other information, however, can be useful in
confirming the higher incidence rate of police brutality against
minorities.57 For example, Los Angeles paid $10 million
in claims to
58
Blacks and Hispanic who were unjustly treated by cops.
Those who study police brutality cases cite racism as a leading
cause of police violence. 59 Racism appears to stem from the belief
that minorities, often African-Americans, are more dangerous and
inclined to engage in criminal behavior than whites. 60 This belief has
long fueled white fears of minority violence and has led to police
brutality against minorities. 6 1 This belief has also contributed to the
destruction of African-American lives by forcing them into the
criminal justice system in disproportionate numbers. 62 For example,
the U.S. Justice Department found that in 1990, more than 1.5 million
African-Americans were in jail, on probation, or on parole. 63 Other
studies focusing on urban areas have found that black males fared
even worse. 64 In Baltimore, Maryland, 56% of the black male
56 See Kevin P. Jenkins, Police Use of Deadly Force Against Minorities:

Ways to Stop the Killing, 9 HARv. BLACKLETrER J. 1, 3 (1992).
" See id. at n.14.
51 See id.
59See Freeman, supra note 43, at 696-97; Jenkins, supra note 56, at 4 (stating
that police officers concede that racism may be a factor for some officers, but they believe
that there are just "a few rotten apples" in the force which is otherwise dedicated and
fair).
60See Freeman, supra note 43, at 693.
61See Freeman, supra note 43, at 694.
62 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 694.
63See Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The DevastatingImpact of the Justice System
on the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. REV.
23, 35-36 (1994).
64See id. at 36.
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population between the ages of 18 and 35 were under the supervision
of the criminal justice system.6 5 Instead of calling for reform,
however, the criminal justice system has continued to treat African66
Americans as if they are a menace to society.
While African-Americans are not the only victims of police
brutality, they have been particularly singled out in the war on
crime. 67 Most Americans, black and white, believe there is a need to
get tough on crime in the United States, particularly "eliminating the
sale, use and distribution of illegal drugs." 68 Tragically, "the war on
drugs has resulted in a disproportionate number of African-American
males being arrested, sentenced and incarcerated." 6 9 The concern is
not that African-American males are being incarcerated, but "that
African-American communities are the primary targets for drug
enforcement sweeps" and that African-American males are therefore
more likely to be targeted for arrest and to receive lengthier sentences
than whites who commit the same or similar crimes. 7 The war on
drugs has become almost equivalent to "policing the African71
American communities and black males.",
Cities have employed a practice of stopping and ticketing
blacks that drive into the city, especially black males, when police
suspect they may be carrying drugs. 72 In many instances, the
immutable characteristic of being black is enough to give the law
enforcement agent a sufficient basis for probable cause to stop drivers
65id.

66 Freeman, supra note 43, at 695.
67 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 695; see also Weatherspoon, supra note 63,
at 30 (1994) (discussing the concerns that African-American communities are the primary

targets for drug enforcement sweeps).
68See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 30.
69 See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 30.
70 See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 30.
71See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 30-3 1.
72See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 31 (stating that African-Americans
are also targets of discrimination from local law enforcement authorities when they are in
predominately white areas); see also Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The Urban Criminal Justice
System: Where Young + Black + Male = Probable Cause, 20 FODHAM URB. L.J. 621,
624 (1993) (noting that the racial disparity is drawn by officers prior to arrest and may
affect the decision to arrest or to believe that the individual is a lawbreaker).
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for interrogation." 3 This is not meant to suggest that drug laws should
not be enforced against African-Americans; however,
African74
Americans should not be singled out for enforcement.
To demonstrate how African Americans are harassed, the
ABC television program 20/20 conducted a study.75 The show placed
members of its staff in expensive cars at 3:30 a.m. in front of a
restaurant in a primarily white neighborhood.7 6 The white male
employees were placed in one car, while the black male employees
were placed in another car." Almost instantly, a police officer
approached the car with the black males and informed them that
"people would say they look suspicious. 7 8 The white males in the
nearby car were never approached or questioned, even though they
were passed more than 15 times by police officers.79
B. Police Practicesand the Effect of Police Culture
Police brutality incidents are becoming more prevalent as
corruption continues to grow.80 Studies have indicated that there is
corruption among many police officers. 8 1 In 1992, the Mollen
Commission was created to "investigate corruption in the New York
City Police Department, evaluate procedures for preventing and
71 See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 30-3,1; see also David Rudovsky,
Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained? 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 489

(1992) (noting that in poor urban areas, which consist mostly of minorities, it is not
unusual for police officers to conduct sweeps of neighborhoods, or to stop or arrest people
without suspicion).
74 See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 31.

75 See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 32 (referring to the 20/20
investigative news program (ABC News television broadcast, Nov. 6, 1992))
76 See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 32.
77 See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 32.
78 Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 32.

79 See Weatherspoon, supra note 63, at 32.
80 Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth
Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt,

23 CAP. U. L. REv. 151, 198 (1994).
81 NEW YORK CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, 18941994: Volume VI, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE

POLICE DEP'T (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1997) [hereinafter Mollen Comm'n].
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detecting corruption, and to make recommendations for changes and
improvements in the procedures." 8 2 One of the findings of the Mollen
Commission was that corruption and brutality are often linked, since
83
many corrupt police officers were found to be brutalizing civilians.
Department practices and the effects of police culture "create an
atmosphere that places the police officer in an oppositional posture to
the public, instills hostilities within departments, and imposes
stressors on individual police officers....
i. Police Practices
Police practices have been found to foster corruption. The
Mollen Commission revealed that the former corrupt police officer,
Michael Dowd, was found by the police department to turn his back
on drug deals in exchange for bribes and later became a drug dealer
himself.8 5 His activities were found not to be isolated incidents but,
rather, revealed that corruption pervaded the entire police
department.8 6 The Commission found that corruption in the New
York City Police Department today is more violent, premeditated and
invidious in nature than corruption that existed in police departments a
generation ago.8 7 Investigations disclosed that groups of officers
assist and protect drug traffickers so that the officers can receive

82 Id. at 1. The Commission, chaired by Milton Mollen, investigated police
corruption in New York City. Id.
83See id. at 44. The Mollen Commission found that "[u]ntil now there has

always been a distinction drawn between corruption and brutality. Corruption was about
money; brutality was about unnecessary force and abuse of authority. That distinction
has in some cases blurred." Id. at 45.
84 Id. at 198-99.
" Id. at 2.
86See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 10-11.
87 See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 10. Michael Armstrong, Chief
Counsel of the Knapp Commission, testified before the Mollen Commission, saying that

"[t]he crooks, however, that you have uncovered, the criminals seem to be a different
breed of criminals [than twenty-years ago] .... Instead of taking money to look the other
way while someone else commits a street crime, [the police officers are] out there
competing with the criminals to commit street crimes themselves, and it seems to me that
is a big difference." Id.
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profits from them. 8 The officers also commit burglary and robbery,
perform unlawful searches,9 commit perjury and falsify statements, and
8
engage in police brutality.
Police corruption often involves groups of police officers that
participate in more than one incident. 90 As the Mollen Commission
revealed, almost all of the corruption involved groups of police
officers, called "crews," who would protect and help with each others'
criminal activities. 91 The crews would locate drug sites, plan raids,
forcibly enter and loot drug trafficking locations, and share
proceeds.92 For example, in the 7 3 rd precinct, the Commission found
that a crew of eight to ten officers performed unlawful drug raids from
1988-1992. 9'
ii. The Effects of Police Culture
The Mollen Commission revealed that there were various
influences and attitudes encouraging police officers to ignore their
integrity.9 4 These influences and attitudes included a sense that the
department cared more about the careers of the commanders than the
integrity of the police officers, the blue code of silence, and the
hostility between the police and the public that creates an "us against
95
them" mentality.
The Mollen Commission revealed that "the principle of
command accountability[,J which holds commanders responsible for
fighting corruption, completely collapsed. 96
Supervisors and
88 See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 10.
'9See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at
90See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at
91See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at
92 See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at
93See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81,

10.
17-18.
17.
17.

at 17. At times, the group would
attend clandestine meetings in out of the way places located in the precinct to "drink,avoid patrol duties and plan future raids." Id.
94 See Hon. Harold Baer, Jr. & Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission
Report: An Overview, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 73, 79 (1995) (discussing the Mollen
Commission's findings on the effect of police culture on corruption).
95
Id.
96 See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 3.
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commanding officers were complacent about integrity and few were

worried about corruption. 97 One officer stated that during his roll call,
his commanding officer said that he was aware that some of the
officers were involved in acts of corruption
and that if an officer got
98
caught, that officer should keep quiet.
The blue code of silence also pushes police officers to
compromise their integrity. 99 The code is an unwritten rule that a
police officer will not incriminate another officer, and seems to be
most powerful in areas where corruption is frequent.10 0
The
pervasiveness of the blue code of silence is reinforced by the severe
consequences for police officers who violate it. 10 1. Officers who

violate the code "are ostracized and harassed; become targets of
complaints and even physical threats; and are made to fear that they
will be left alone on the streets in a time of crisis."' 2 Therefore, even
though many police officers
are opposed to corruption, they often are
3
10
reluctant to report it.

The police culture also creates an "us versus them" mentality
between police officers and the public. 10 4 "The loyalty ethic and
97 See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 3.
98See Mollen Comm'n, supra note'81, at 3.
99 See Baer & Armao, supra note 94, at 79.

'°See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 51, 53; see also SKOLNICK & FYFE,
supra.note 41, at 110-11. "[T]he code... typically is enforced by the threat of shunning,
by fear that informing will lead to exposure of one's own derelictions, and by fear that
colleagues' assistance may be withheld in emergencies . . . . In the closed society of
police departments, especially in department units that see themselves and the public in
terms of 'us and them' and adopt the siege view of the world, the pressure to remain loyal
is enormous." Id.
lot See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 53. Detective Frank Serpico stated
that "[w]e must create an atmosphere in which the dishonest officer fears the honest one,
and not the other way around." Id. at 5i (testifying before the Knapp Commission, Dec.
1971).
102See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 53. In one case, a police officer
who had violated the code was transferred-to a precinct detective squad. Id. at 54. During
his first week, his colleagues made him aware that he would be alone on the streets. Id. at
54 -55. The police officers placed dead rats on his windshield, took or destroyed the
officer's personal property, and told'him that he could not rely on them in times of
danger. Id. at 55.
103See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 56.
104Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 58.
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insularity that breed the blue code of silence that protects offices from
other offices also erects a protective barrier between the police and the
public."' 0 5 Many police officers "view the public as trouble rather
than as people they were sworn to serve."' 6 This is especially the
precincts where police officers view the public
case in crime-infested
07
as the "enemy."'
Police practices and the effect of police culture contribute to
police corruption.'0 Since the Mollen Commission found that
corruption and police brutality are often linked, as a step towards
combating police brutality and protecting victims' civil rights,
preventive strategies for deterring corruption have to be implemented
in police departments.

IV. CRIMINAL LAW REMEDIES

There is no statute that specifically prohibits police brutality,
but victims can bring an action under state or federal law on other
grounds.'0 9 Victims often bring claims against police officers under
state law for assault, battery, manslaughter, and murder."0° Police
may also be charged under federal law with the "willful deprivation of
a federal or constitutional right under color of law." ' ' Regardless of
whether the victim brings an action under state or federal law, the first
issue that must be resolved is2 whether the police officer's use of force
was objectively reasonable."
Federal prosecutors may bring a criminal action under Federal
Criminal Code § 242,113 which states that in order to prove a person
105See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 58.

106 See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 58.
107See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 58.

108
See Magee, supra note 80, at 202.
109
See Freeman, supra note 43, at 686.
110See Freeman, supra note 43, at 687.
11 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 687-87. Federal claims against excessive
force of police officers are usually brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
112Graham v. O'Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (holding that reasonableness is
determined by an objective standard).
...18 U.S.C. § 242(1988).
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was deprived of his or her rights, a plaintiff must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the police officer "willfully subjected [the
plaintiff] in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
. . on account
of such person being an.alien, or by reason of his color,
114
or race."'

An individual found guilty of violating the federal law may be
fined, imprisoned for up to a year, or both. 5 If the victim suffers
"bodily injury from the acts committed ...or if such acts include the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of a weapon, explosives, or fire",
the perpetrator may be fined, imprisoned up to ten years, or both.' 6 If
the victim dies as a result of the acts committed, or if the acts include
kidnapping, an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, an attempt
to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the
perpetrator will be fined or imprisoned for any term of years including
life, or both, or may be sentenced to death." 7
An example of a case, brought under federal law is United
States v. Koon.1 8 This case involved the arrest of Rodney King in the
early morning of March 3, 1991."9 King, on the evening of March 2,
1991, had met with two friends, and sat with them in a car 2in0
Altadena, a suburb of Los Angeles, consuming malt liquor.1
Although the exact amount of alcohol King consumed was unknown,
he consumed more than 80 ounces.1 21 Later in the evening, King and
his friends left 22
the location where they had been parked, with King
car.'
the
driving

11

4 id.
115See id.
116See id.
117See id.

"8 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994),

rev'd, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512 (U.S. June 13, 1996).
"9 See id. at 775.'
120 See id.
121See id.
122See

id.
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Two California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers observed King
speeding on a freeway and activated their red lights and siren to try to
get King to pull over.1 23 One of the officers called for back up and
Officers Laurence Powell and Timothy Wind of the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD), as well as other patrol officers in the
nearby area, responded. 24 Three police cars chased King's vehicle
25
for several miles before the pursuit ended.
At that point, one of the CHP officers ordered the occupants
out of the car, so the two passengers left the vehicle and King slowly
followed them.' 26 When Sergeant Stacey Koon arrived at the scene,
followed by Officers Theodore Briseno and Rolando Solano, Sergeant
Koon took command and the LAPD began the arrest process.' 27 The
officers ordered King to lie in the felony-prone position, but he
refused. 28 Officers Powell, Wind, Briseno and Solano then tried to
place King in the position, but "he resisted
and became combative,
129
compelling the officers to back away."'
The events that occurred involving King and the police were
videotaped by George Holliday.' 3 0 , The videotape shows Sergeant
Koon firing at and hitting King with two 50,000-volt Taser darts, and
then shows Officers Powell, Wind, and Sergeant Koon each beating
King.' 3 1 The video shows the 32
officers giving 56 blows to King and
kicking King's body and head.'
Police Officers Powell, Briseno, Koon and Wind were charged
in state court with "specific charges of assault by force likely to
123Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 775.
124See id.
125See id.
126See id.
127 See id. at 775-76.

128See Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 776; see also Koon, 34 F.3d at 1424 (noting
that King was ordered to lie in a felony prone position which was "on his stomach with
his arms behind his back, legs spread, heels turned towards the ground, and head turned
away from the officers").
129 Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 776.
130 See id.

...See Sa'id Weikili & Hyacinth E. Leus, Police Brutality: Problems of
Excessive Force
Litigation, 25 PAC. L.J. 171, 183-84 (1994).
32
See id. at 183-84.
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produce great bodily injury and with a deadly weapon; and an officer
unnecessarily assaulting or beating any person."' 33 Koon and Powell
were charged with submission of a false police report by a peace
officer. 134 Koon was also charged with the crime of accessory after
the fact. 35 "On April 29, 1992, the four officers were acquitted of ten
of eleven counts of state charges, and the jury deadlocked eight to four
in favor of acquitting Powell of excessive force.' 36 The verdict
triggered rioting in Los Angeles that resulted in 53 deaths, 2,383
people injured, and 17,000 people arrested. 37 On August 4, 1992, a
federal grand jury indicted the defendants, charging them with
violating King's civil rights. 38 Officers Powell, Briseno and Wind
were charged in federal court with the willful use of unreasonable
force in arresting King,' 39 while Koon was charged with willfully
1 40
allowing the officers to use unreasonable force during the arrest.
The jury returned a guilty 4verdict
against Powell and Koon, and
1
acquitted Briseno and Wind.1
The King case illustrates some of the problems encountered in
police brutality actions. 142 Although criminal law remedies are
available to victims of police brutality, the cases are difficult to
establish because the victim must prove that the police officer had the
intent to deprive the victim of a constitutional right. 43 Therefore,
criminal law remedies not only fail to deter police brutality, but also
fail to protect victims' civil rights.

133
Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1991).
134 See id.
135 See id.

136Wehili & Leus, supra note 131, at 185.
137
See Wehili & Leus, supra note 131, at 185.
138 See Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 774. The defendants were indicted under 18
U.S.C. § 242. Id. at 774.
139
See id. at 774.
140 See Koon, 833 F. Supp..at 774.
141See id.

142Wekili & Leus, supra note 131, at 187.

143R. Samuel Paz, Civil Rights Law: The Needfor a New Look at an Old
Bandaid, 14 CHICANO-LATiNO L.R. 20, 21 (1994).
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A. Prosecutor'sConflict of Interest

One problem in these criminal cases is that there is a conflict
of interest between the local district attorney and the police because
the majority of criminal cases are prosecuted by the District Attorney
using police assistance. 144 The prosecution relies on the police by
calling them to the stand as the main witnesses. 145 Thus, as the
prosecutor and police work together to convict individuals who are
arrested by police, "a dilemma arises in that police officers are taught
that the District Attorney is their ally. 146 Howeyer, if an officer is
charged with police: brutality, the department they relied on as their
ally becomes their enemy."' 47 A conflict of interest may arise between
the prosecutor's obligation to prosecute a brutality case and the
relationship the prosecutor has with the police officer charged with
brutality. 48 The symbiotic relationship that is created between the
district attorney and the police. may, be destroyed if the district

attorney pursues the case, so in most instances, the district attorney's
office will use its discretion to decline pursuing the victim's claim
against the police officer. 149 Thus, most police brutality cases that are
filed are prosecuted by the federal government under the civil rights
50
laws. 1
Professor Louis Schwartz of the University of Pennsylvania
conducted a study in which he examined 25 police complaints filed by

144

See Wekili & Leus, supra note 131, at 188.

145 See Wekili & Leus, supra note 131, at 188.
146 See

Wekili & Leus, supra noie 131, at 188.
Wekili & Leus, supra note 132,at 188.
148 Wekili & Leus, supra note 132, at 188; see also Daniel Wise, Brutality
147

Cases Tough to Prosecute, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1992, at 1. (quoting R. Harcourt Dodd, a
former assistant district attorney in the Brooklyn's District Attorney's Office, as stating
that "one of the biggest problems in police :brutality cases is the challenge to the
prosecutor's creditability because of the inherent conflict that stems from the close
working relationship between police officers and prosecutors.").
149 See Freeman, supra-note 43, at 719.
15o See Freeman, supra note 43, at720.
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individuals with the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office. 15 1 He
concluded that "the District Attorney's office has not been, and, in the
nature of things, could not be, an effective instrument for controlling
police violence.' ' 2
Schwartz stated that the prosecutor is in "a hopeless conflict of
interest position" and listed a number of factors that exist in most
district attorney's offices. 5 3 For example, he stated that while the
district attorney is prosecuting the defendant with the assistance of the
police, the prosecutor must at the same time
prosecute the police
54
officer with the assistance of the defendant.
Furthermore, the study revealed that the district attorney's
office would only bring a charge of brutality against a police officer 5if5
the injury the victim sustained was severe and well documented.'
In many of the cases, the prosecutor tried to encourage the police
officer and civilian to drop the charges against each other. 56 Although
this is understandable from the perspective of the prosecutor who has
a conflict of interest, there are numerous negative consequences and
social costs to this system.15 7 Furthermore, this may motivate the
police officer to file an unwarranted complaint against the civilian to
place the officer in a better position for bargaining purposes. 55
In
fact, the study revealed that in some cases, the police
officers
did
not
159
file a complaint until a charge of brutality was filed.

'5' See Louis B. Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience of the
Community Rights Division of the PhiladelphiaDistrictAttorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 1023 (1970).
2 Id. at 1024.

15 Id.

54Id.
'55 Id. at 1026.
156See Schwartz,

157Schwartz,

supra note 151, at 1026.

supra note 151, at 1026. These cases, which should result in

some punishment to the police officers, are dropped without reprimanding the police
officer. Id.
158Schwartz, supra note 15 1,,at 1026.
159Schwartz, supra note 151, at 1026.
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B. Obstacles in Litigation
If the prosecutors decide to pursue a police brutality case
under 18 U.S.C. § 242, they have a difficult case to prove because
they must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the police officer
acted with the specific intent to deprive the. victim of a constitutional
right.1 60 As the Rodney King case illustrates, this is a difficult
standard to satisfy.16 1 Police brutality cases brought under state law
usually charge assault, battery, manslaughter or murder and, thus, do
not require a prosecutor to prove that the police officer intended to
deprive the victim of a constitutional right.' 62 However, both federal
and state prosecutors must satisfy the criminal burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, a difficult burden to prove in a police brutality

case. 163
Furthermore, the characteristics that make the victims
vulnerable to a police beating are the same characteristics that make
them less credible to juries. 164 For example, victims may have been
165
engaging in criminal activity when the police brutality occurred,
and from the jury's perspective are from the wrong race, age, class,
sex or sexual orientation.' 66 In addition, the victim may have been
drunk, on drugs, have a history of alcoholism or drug addiction, or
may be mentally ill.' 6 7 In contrast, police officers are often viewed by
68
jurors as being credible witnesses because of the position they hold.'
Furthermore, fellow police officers may not offer any evidence to
160 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945) (holding that a specific
intent to deprive an individual of a right arising under the Constitution must be shown to
prove a violation of the Civil Rights Act).
161See Paz, supra note 143, at 20.
162 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 717.
163See Freeman, supra note 43, at 717.
164 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 724.
165See Freeman, supra note 43, at 724; see also Wise, supra note 148, at I
(noting that the victims of police brutality often have long arrest records which tend to
weaken their creditability).
166 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 724.
167 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 724.
168See Freeman, supra note 43, at 724; see also Wise, supra note 148, at 1.
"[J]uries see police as 'standing between them andmayhem' and are likely to believe that
the suspects 'got what they deserved' as long as they were not killed." Id.
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incriminate the police officer because they are adhering to the code of

silence.

169

Even if the prosecution is able to present sufficient evidence to
convince a jury of the facts of the case, the jury may still be unwilling
to convict the police officer. 170 Prosecutors are then confronted with
jury nullification. 7 ' The "thin blue line" may be partially responsible
for jury nullification because the police are all that stands between the
citizenry and anarchy. 72 It seems that "police comprise the only class
of criminal defendants who are universally accorded the legally
required presumption of innocence." 173 Thus, for numerous reasons,
police brutality convictions are infrequent. 174
VI. CIVIL LAW REMEDIES

Because the criminal justice system is reluctant to bring
criminal prosecutions for police brutality, and due to the other social
and legal implications that are involved in bringing a criminal action
against police officers, the majority of the claims are pursued by the
individuals who allege a deprivation of civil rights under Section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act. 75 This Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
169
See Freeman, supra note 43, at 725.
170 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 726.
171See Freeman, supra note 43, at 726.
172 See Freeman, supra note 43, at 726.
173
Freeman, supra note 43, at 726.
174
See Freeman, supra note 43, at 726.
17'
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes
of this section, any Act of Congress . . . shall
be
76
Columbia.
of
District
the
of
statute
a
considered
A key issue in civil rights cases is the standard the court will
apply in deciding the case. 17 7 In Tennessee v. Garner,178 the Supreme
Court addressed the standard to apply in excessive force cases. In
Garner,police officers were deployed to answer a call reporting that
there was a prowler inside the house.17 9 When they arrived, a woman
who was standing on her porch motioned to the adjacent house . 180
The woman told the police officers that she heard glass breaking and
someone was breaking into the house.' 8' Elton Hymon, one of the
police officers, walked to the back of the house and saw someone
fleeing across the backyard. 8 2 While Hymon was only able to see
using a flashlight, he said he was reasonably sure that Garner, the
perpetrator, was unarmed. 8 3 However, when Gamer started climbing
84
to stop, Hymon shot him.'
over a fence, despite Hymon's 8 order
5
Garner later died in the hospital.'
Gamer's father sued Officer Hymon, the Memphis Police
Department, its Director, the Mayor and the city of Memphis for
violating Gamer's constitutional rights. 8 6 The Court held that the
excessive force used during an arrest, and specifically in this case, the
use of deadly force, constituted a seizure and was subject to the
reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment. 8 7 The Court then applied
the reasonable person test under the totality of the circumstances to
176 Id.

177 Wekili & Leus, supra note 131, at 197.
178 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
179
80

1

id. at 3.
Id.

181 Id.

182Id.

183Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
184Id.at 4.
185 id.
186Id. at 5. Gamer's father brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
187Id. at 7. The reasonableness of a seizure depends not only when the

seizure is made but also how it is carried out. Id. at 8-9.
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determine whether the seizure was justified, and ultimately found
that
88
the use of deadly force was unconstitutionall'yunreasonable.1
A different standard was applied by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Johnson v. Glick.189 In this case, Johnson was
being held in the Manhattan House of Detention for Men before and
during his trial for felony charges. 90 Johnson alleged that an officer
reprimanded him for not following instructions, and after Johnson
tried to explain he had simply been adhering to another officer's
instructions, the officer rushed into his cell, grabbed him by the neck,
and struck him over the head.' 9' Johnson further alleged that the
officer threatened to kill him, kept him in a holding cell for two hours
before bringing him back to his cell, and made him wait for two hours
before providing him with medical attention. 192 Johnson brought an
93
action against the warden and the guard of the detention facility.
The Johnson court applied a substantive due process claim test
to determine whether there had been a violation of Johnson's
constitutional rights.'9 4 The test used by the court was: (1) whether
the police officers had used excessive force upon an individual that
would violate that individual's substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) whether the force was excessive
'' 95
so as to "shock the conscience.
In determining whether there had been a constitutional
violation, the court looked at four factors. 96 These factors were: the
need for the use of force; the relationship between the need and the
188Garner,471 U.S. at 8-9, II.

9 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1029.
191Id. at 1029-30.
190

192 Id.

193Id. at 1029.
194 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1032. "Quite apart from any 'specific' of

the Bill of Rights, applications of undue force by law enforcement officers deprives a
suspect of liberty without due process of law." Id.

"95 Id. at 1032-33.
"The acts more than 'offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically' . ..
they must be such as 'to offend even hardened sensibilities".., or constitute force that is
'brutal' and 'offensive
to human dignity."' Id. at n:6.
196 Id. at 1033.
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degree of force used; the extent of the injury; and whether the force
97
was applied in good faith or whether the officer acted with malice.'
The court held that Johnson had proved his98 claim against the officer
but dismissed the claim against the warden.1
In Graham v. Connor,199 the U.S. Supreme Court altered the
constitutional analysis used in excessive force claims. 200 In this case,
Graham, a diabetic, asked his friend to drive him to a convenience
store to purchase orange juice to counteract an insulin reaction from
which he was suffering. 20 After he had entered the store and saw
numerous people standing on line, Graham left the store and asked his
friend to drive him to another friend's house. 20 2 After seeing Graham
quickly leave the store, Police Officer Connor made what he called an
investigation stop of their vehicle and ordered Graham and his friend
to wait until they learned what had happened in the store. 20 3 Graham's
friend, William Berry, explained to Connor that Graham was having a
sugar reaction.204 Backup police officers arrived and one of the
officers handcuffed Graham, ignoring Berry's request that Graham be
given sugar. 20 5 A few officers picked Graham up, placed him face
down on the hood of the car, and threw him head first in the police
car. 20 6 During this incident, Graham suffered multiple injuries. 20 7 He
was released
after the police learned that nothing occurred in the
20 8
store.
Graham sued the individual officers involved in the incident,
alleging that they used excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth

197 id.

198 Id. at 1033-34.

'99490 U.S. 386 (1989).
200 Wekili & Leus, supra note 13 1, at 199.
201 Connor, 481 F.2d at 388.
202 Id. at 388-89.
203 Id. at 389.

204/id.
205

Id.

206 Connor, 481 F.2d at 389.

207 Id. Graham's injuries included a broken foot, cuts on his wrist, a bruised

forehead, an injured shoulder and ringing in his right ear. Id. at 390.
208 Id.
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Amendment of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983.209 The court
rejected the "shocking of the conscience" substantive due process test
set forth in Johnson v. Glick, holding that excessive force claims
should be examined under the Fourth Amendment and its
reasonableness standard, instead of a 'substantive due process'
analysis. 210 The Court rejected the notion that "all excessive force
claims brought under section 1983 are controlled by a single generic
standard. 2 1 Instead, the Court ruled that the specific constitutional
right which has been violated because of the use of force must be
to
recognized and then the court can determine the claim by21referring
2
the specific constitutional standard that controls that right.
The Graham Court held that in determining whether the force
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment test, the court must
balance "'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental
interests at stake." 21 3 The reasonableness of the use of force must be
"judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight .... [T]he calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." 214 The
Court also stated that in excessive force claims, the reasonableness
inquiry is objective. 2 15 The question for the Court was whether the
police officers' actions in using excessive force was objectively
the
reasonable, considering the facts and the situation with 2which
16
officers were faced, regardless of their intent or motivation.

209 See Connor, 481 F.2d at 390.
210 See Connor, 481 F.2d at 395.
211Connor, 490 U.S. at 387.
212See id.
213Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
214See id. at 396-97.
215See id. at 397. "[I]n analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or

seizure, 'it
is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard."' Id.
216 See Connor, 490 U.S. at 397.
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VII. POLICE OFFICER'S DEFENSE: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
While victims of police brutality can bring an action under
section 1983217 against the police officer and the municipality, the
police officer and municipality are each subject to liability under two
different theories.218 Police officers are found liable iUnder the statute
if, "while acting under color of state law, their actions violate a
person's constitutional rights. 219 Municipalities are not liable under
the theory of respondeat superior, but may be found liable if the police
officer's conduct follows an official policy or practice of the
municipality. 220 There are differences between an action brought
against a police officer and an action brought against a municipality,
such as the defenses that can be asserted.2
Once a victim brings an excessive force claim against a police
officer under section 1983, the officer may assert a defense of
qualified immunity. 222 InGraham, the Supreme Court did not address
the issue of qualified immunity in Fourth Amendment excessive force
claims. 223 However, the Court did discuss the qualified immunity
2 24 In Harlow, A. Ernest Fitzgerald
defense in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
sued Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield, Richard Nixon's White
House aides, alleging they had been involved in a conspiracy to
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
218See Nicole G. Tell, Representing Police Officers and Municipalities: A
217

Conflict of Interest for a Municipal Attorney in a § 1983 Police Misconduct Suit, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 2825 (1997).
219 Id. at 2829.
220 See id. at 2830.

221See id. at 2829. Police officers are provided with a qualified immunity
defense in their individual capacity while the municipality does not have the qualified
immunity defense. Id. at 2831-32. Police officers and municipalities are liable for
different types of damages since police officers may be liable for compensatory and
punitive damages and in some cases are required to pay the prevailing plaintiff's attorney
fees. Id. at 2833. A municipality, on the other hand, may be only liable for compensatory
damages and plaintiff attorney's fees. Id.
222 See id. at 283 1. This qualified immunity is also known as the "good faith"
defense because police office can use it if they can demonstrate that they were acting in
accordance with the law as they knew it at the time. Id.
223See Connor,490 U.S. at n.12.,
224 457 U.S. 800 (1981).
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violate his constitutional and statutory rights.225 The Court held that
the aides were protected by a qualified immunity. 226 The Court stated
that:
[B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to
subject governmental officials either to the costs of
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.
We therefore hold that government officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not clearly violate, established
of which a reasonable
statutory or constitutional rights
227
known.
have
would
person
The Court went on to state that by defining the limits of the
qualified immunity doctrine in objective terms, it was not authorizing
lawless conduct. 228 Rather, the objective reasonableness of an
official's acts protects the public interest by discouraging unlawful
conduct and compensating victims. 229 If an official could be expected
to know that an act would violate statutory or constitutional rights, the
officer should not perform the act, and if a person was injured by the
act, that person should have a cause of action. 230 However, if the
official's duties require action be taken in which clearly established
rights are not involved, "the public interest may be better served by
action taken 23 'with independence and without fear of
consequences.'

1

The objective reasonableness standard was also used in
Anderson v. Creighton.232 In Anderson, FBI agent Russell Anderson
was working with other law enforcement officers involved in a
225

226

See id. at 802.
id. at 806.

...
Id. at 818.
228 See id. at 819.
229 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 819.
230 See id.
231

Id.

232 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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warrantless search of Robert Creighton's home. 233 The search was
performed because the FBI agent believed that a bank robbery suspect
might be in the house.2 34 Creighton brought an action in state court
against Anderson, asserting a Fourth Amendment violation.23 5
Anderson removed the suit to federal court and then filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending the claim was barred by his qualified
immunity.236 However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
denied Anderson's motion, finding that Creighton demonstrated that
Anderson violated Creighton's right to be protected from warrantless
searches of his home. An exception from this constitutional right, the
court noted, was if officers have probable cause or in situations where
there are exigent circumstances.2 37
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that it was
concerned about the test of "clearly established law" 238 because if the
test were applied to cases at this level of generality, it would not have
any relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness., 239 The Court
also stated that plaintiffs would be able to change the rule of qualified
immunity "into a rule of virtually unqualified liability of government
agents by alleging a violation of extremely abstract rights." 240 The
right must be clear enough that a reasonable governmental official
would know that his conduct violates that right. 24 1 The question that
must be asked is an objective, albeit fact specific one, whether a
reasonable officer could find that Anderson's search was lawful, "in
light of clearly established law and the information the searching

See id. at 637.
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See Creighton, 483 U.S. at 635.
238 Id. at 639. A "clearly established" right means that "[t]he contours of the
233

right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right." Id. at 640.
239 Id. at 639.
240 Id. Harlow would be changed from an immunity guarantee into a rule of
pleading. Id.

241See id. at 640.
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officers possessed.' '24 2 The court found243that Anderson's "subjective
belief about the search were irrelevant."
Furthermore,. in Owens v. City of Independence,244 the Court
held that a municipality cannot allege a qualified immunity defense.
The Court stated that "many victims of municipal malfeasance would
be left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith
defense." 245 Therefore, a municipality can only escape liability if it
claims that a constitutional violation did not occur or that the police
officer was not acting in good
faith "pursuant to a policy, practice, or
246
municipality.
the
of
custom
Thus, if a police brutality victim brings an action against the
police officer and municipality under section 1983, the Court will
examine the claim under the Fourth Amendment and its reasonable
standard to determine whether the police officer's conduct was
excessive or unreasonable. Although police officers may assert a
qualified immunity defense to the claim, municipalities are not
afforded this defense.
VIII. WHY CIVIL LAW REMEDIES FAIL To DETER
A victim of police brutality who chooses to bring an action
under section 1983 is confronted with many challenges. The victim's
first task is to find an attorney willing to take the case, 247 which can be
difficult because. many attorneys are reluctant to take police brutality
claims. 24 8 The attorney and the victim must then deal with the
financial, procedural, and evidentiary burdens that this type -of case
presents.24
242 Creighton, 483 U.S. at 636.

243 id.
244 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding that municipalities are not granted immunity

from liability under section 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations).
245 Id. at: 65 1.,
246 Tell, supra note 218i at 2832.
247 See Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 US.C. Sec.
1983 is Ineffective in DeterringPolice Brutality,44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 755 (1993).
248 See id. at 756.
249 See id. at 755.
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Finding an attorney for a victim of a police brutality claim
may be difficult for numerous reasons. 250 Often both the victims and
witnesses lack credibility and the money to pursue the claim. 251 "The
victims of police brutality are usually young African American or
Latino males who are from poor areas and often have criminal
records. 252 These victims are not perceived as being plaintiffs with

whom the jury can sympathize.253 Furthermore, most of the section
1983 cases accepted by attorneys are done so on a contingency
basis. 254 This makes the cases less attractive to attorneys because of
the financial risk involved.2 55

Even if an attorney accepts a case, it is still difficult to win a
suit for damages under section 1983 because the plaintiff must prove
that the officer's force was "excessive" or "unreasonable," a standard
that may be difficult to satisfy because the courts tend to favor
officers. 256 Officers may also assert the defense of qualified
immunity. 25 This means that a jury can. absolve the police officer

from liability if they find that the officer objectively believed his
actions were reasonable.258 In addition, even if the victim is only
suing the police officer, the victim is often confronted with challenges
by the municipality since the city attorneys defend the suit.259 In some

250 See id. Victims will have trouble finding an attorney "unless there are
credible witnesses, tangible evidence, or severe brutality." Id. Many lawyers are not
familiar with section 1983 and "fear the notion of fighting city hall." Id. Other lawyers
may avoid litigation against police officers because they feel that their opportunity for
judicial appointments may be harmed or their chance for obtaining business from public
entities and politicians may be lessened. Id.
251 See Patton, supra note 247, at 755.
252 Patton, supra note 247, at 756.
253See Patton, supra note 247, at 756.
254See Patton, supra note 247, at 756.
255See Patton, supra note 247, at 756-57.
256 See Patton, supra note 247, at 758. The protection that is given to police
officers is grounded on the "presumption that the use of force is necessary to maintain
social order and to apprehend persons suspected of committing crimes." Id.
257 See Patton, supra note 247, at 759.
258See Paz, supra note 143, at 26.
259 See Patton, supra note 247, at 759-60.
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cases, "the city retains outside
counsel in addition to using city
260
attorneys to defend the suit."

Another obstacle faced by victims is that civil cases can drag
on for years, and most victims do not have the perseverance or the
financial resources to continue with the litigation. 26'

Victims also

must overcome the police officers' "code of silence" to uncover
information, 262 as many officers will lie or say that they did not
witness the incident rather than jeopardize a fellow officer.2 63
Furthermore, victims'also face jury bias
because juries are more likely
264
to believe the police than the victims.
Civil remedies are thus inappropriate in deterring police
brutality. 265 "If the speed and certainty of punishment is necessary to
serve as credible deterrents, the lack of these factors may be one
reason why civil suits fail to deter police brutality." 266 Police officers
267

need more than a threat of liability to change their behavior.
Section 1983 suits do not deter because "many officers lose nothing as
a result of being sued

. .

. It costs them nothing financially, it never

260 Patton, supra note 247, at 759-60.
261 See

Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police

Brutality in America: Direct and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Remedies for
Victims of Police Brutality when the Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV.
271,287(1994).
262 See Patton, supra note 247, at 763; see also Freeman, supra note 43, at
725 (noting that "police officers will not come forward due to the 'code of silence."').
263 See Patton, supra note 247, at 763; see also Victor Merina, Morgan
Awarded $540,00 By Jurors, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1991, at BI (noting that the testimony
of a DEA agent supporting a police officers testimony conflicted with eyewitness'
testimony).
264 See Patton, supra note 247, at 764-65; see also Weikili & Leus, supra note
131, at 189 (stating that juries'are more inclined to believe the police rather than the
victims especially when police are trained to be expert witnesses).
265 See Davis, supra note 26 1,-at 287.
266 Davis, supra note 261, at 287; see also Patton, supra note 247, at 767-68
(noting that the lack of deterrence from § 1983 suits is because officers lose nothing as a
result of being sued).
267 See Davis, supra note 261, at 287.
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results in discipline, it has no effect of promotion, and it does not
affect the way officers are regarded by their peers and superiors. 268
IX. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BoARDs

Another option for victims of excessive force by police
officers is to file a complaint with the local Civilian Complaint
Review Board, which is compromised of citizens who investigate
complaints made against police officers. 269 After conducting the
investigations, however, the review boards do not have much real
270
power as they can only suggest punishment or further investigation.
The police chief or commissioner decides the disciplinary action that
is taken against the police officer.27 '
Opponents of the review boards contend that civilians lack the
understanding about police work and police-related problems, and
cannot accurately decide whether the claim has any merit.272 Others
argue that "the existing systems for dealing with citizens complaints
are adequate and contend that review boards are not needed. 273
Some also argue against civilian hearings because they are afraid that
the rights of police officers will not be protected because the
investigation274 is conducted in a non-judicial administrative
proceeding.
268 Patton, supra note 247, at 767-68 (noting that there is no economic or
professional incentives for a police officers to change violent behavior); see also id. at
771.
269
See Edward J. Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent of
Police Misconduct, 59 U. DET. J.URB. L. 5, 8 (1981).(noting that dissatisfaction with
police department's internal complaint procedures, especially among minority groups and
civil rights organizations, led to the need for civilian complaint boards).
270 See id.

271See id. "A principal criticism of the single police commissioner has been
the co-optation of the position of the police. Rather than action as the citizens'
representative, the commissioner, more often than not, is the police department's
spokesperson ...."Id.
272 See id. at 9.
273

Id.

274

See Littlejohn, supra note 269, at 9.
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New York City's Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB),
one of the earliest review boards, was established when John V.
Lindsay was elected as mayor. 275 Mayor Lindsay replaced Police
Commissioner Broderick with Commissioner Leary because unlike
Broderick, Leary was in favor of the CCRB and Leary changed the
rules and procedures for dealing with the complaints. 276 Previously,
the CCRB had received an average of 200 complaints a year while the
new CCRB averaged 100 complaints a month.2 77 Nevertheless,
although the new CCRB was more effective, it was subject to more
opposition and was abolished in 2 78
1966 because people worried it
would undermine law enforcement.
In 1993, another CCRB in New York City was created by
Mayor David Dinkins. 279 The law established an independent CCRB,
giving it its own budget and the authority to subpoena witnesses.2 8 °
The CCRB was made up of 13 members who were officially
appointed by the mayor.281 The Mayor selected five members, the
City Council recommended five members, one from282each borough,
and the Police Commissioner selected three members.
Despite numerous efforts, the CCBR is not working. Over the
past few years, "about 22 percent of the complaints filed with the
CCRB involving excessive force, racial insults, and other misconduct
have been fully investigated, but investigators failed to reach

275See Littlejohn, supra note 269, at 20.

In 1966, John V. Lindsay was

elected as Mayor of New York. Id.
276 See Littlejohn, supra note 269, at 20.
277 See Littlejohn, supra note 269, at 20.
278 See Littlejohn, supra note 269, at 21-22. The Patrolman's Benevolent
Association (PBA) was opposed to the CCRB and channeled its opposition through the

Independent Citizens Committee Against Police Review Boards (ICC) which the PBA
sponsored. Id. The PBA also joined with other groups including the John Birch Society,
the Conservative Party and the American Legion Posts in fighting the CCRB. Id. at 22.
279 See Michael H. Cottman, Cop Review Board Signed into Law, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 6, 1993, at 26.
280 See James C. McKinley Jr., Council Backs New Board to Review Police
Conduct, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at B21.
281See id.
282 See id.
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28 3
conclusions on 92 percent of the cases they did investigate."
Norman Siegel, executor director of the New York Civil Liberties
Union, stated that "[t]he figures, included in the group's annual
review of the panel, indicate that New York City has failed in its
mission to create an independent, effective civilian board. ' '284
According to Mr. Siegel, the board's failure can be attributed to
"mismanagement, a lack of leadership, an insufficient number of
investigators, and inadequate financing. 28 5

X. POLICE REFORM
A. Mollen Commission
The Mollen Commission madenumerous suggestions for
future police reform.2 86 The Commission concluded that the New
York Police Department (NYPD) must be accountable for policing
itself.287 The Commission suggested that the NYPD adopt a dualtrack approach to improve the integrity of police officers with the first
track reforming the NYPD's internal operations and the second
track
creating an independent monitor to stop and deter corruption. 28 8
The Commission also made recommendations for reform on
recruitment, screening, training, personnel management, supervision,
internal investigation and police culture. 289 It also recommended
having an independent monitor to oversee the police department. 290

283 Lynette Holloway, Civilian Complaint Board Weak, Rights Group Says,

N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 1996, at B3.
284 id.
285

id
286 See Mollen
287 See Mollen
288See Mollen
289 See Mollen

Comm'n, supra note 81, at 110.
Comm'n, supra note 81, at 110.
Comm'n, supra note 81, at 110.
Comm'n, supra note 81, at 123. The Commission suggested

that the Police Academy employ civilians to help deter corruption and give recruits

civilian points of views. Id.

290 See Mollen Comm'n, supra note 81, at 152.
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B. Reform of Criminaland Civil Law Statutes
In order to deter police officers from committing acts of
brutality, the criminal and civil law.statutes should be reformed.29 '
Under the criminal law statute, 18 U.S.C. 242, the specific intent
requirement should be eliminated.292 Victims of police brutality
should be able to prove liability simply by proving the officer's use of
excessive force. 293 "Even if the intent requirement is removed from
the statute, it will always be extremely difficult to prove that a police
officer used excessive force" beyond a reasonable doubt. 294 However,
it will be easier for the victims to prove police brutality, and this
would deter more police officers from using excessive force.
The effectiveness of the civil law statute section 1983 is
hampered by "the limitations the Supreme Court has imposed on 1983
liability. The theoretical basis of key elements of section 1983 is at
odds with the practical reality that police officers usually do not pay
1983 awards." 2 It would make sense. to have respondeat superior
liability imposed on the employers of police officers because it would
give the employer an incentive to provide better training and
supervision to reduce their liability. 296 Liability should also be
removed from the employee, the police officer, except for egregious
297
cases in which the victim would be awarded punitive damages.
XI. CONCLUSION

The current criminal and civil law remedies do not effectively
deter police brutality. Criminal law remedies fail because of the
prosecutor's discretion to bring a case against the police officer and
291See Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an
Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1453, 1522(1993).
292 See id.
293 See id.
294See id.
295 Id. at 1518..

296 See Hoffman, supra note 291, at 1518.
297 See Hoffman, supra note 291, at 1518.
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the obstacles that are encountered in litigating the case. Civil law
remedies fail to deter because of the police officer's defense of
qualified immunity and the costs and time involved in bringing a case.
The CCRB, as it currently operates, has also proven to be ineffective
in deterring police brutality. Consequently, police brutality victims'
suffer inadequate protection of their civil rights and continue to be at
risk of being abused.
In order to better protect police brutality victims' civil rights,
there needs to be an independent board with broad subpoena power to
monitor and discipline police conduct in every state. Currently, Mayor
Giuliani has, by executive order, selected a group of individuals who
have virtually no independence and rely on decisions from Giuliani's
Commissioner of Investigation. 298 The New York City Council's
proposal to develop a five-member independent review board, two of
whom would be nominated by the Council, 299 would be a step toward
combating police brutality be giving it the independence that it needs
to function effectively.
However, Mayor Giuliani vetoed the proposal and has stated
that his "commitment to corruption is strong ... [b]ut I believe that
the Police Department is, and should continue to be, the first line of
defense against police corruption." 3°° He further stated that an
independent board, if given unlimited investigative powers, would "do
more harm than good.",30 1 However, City Council officials continue
to fight for the review board.3 °2
In addition to creating an independent review board, 18 U.S.C.
242 should be reformed to eliminate the intent requirement, and 18
U.S.C. 1983 should impose respondeat superior liability on

298 N.Y., N.Y. Exec. Order 18 (Feb. 27, 1995).
299 See Marvette Darien & Farhan, United States: Protests Against Police
Fail to Halt New
York Veto, INTER. PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 31, 1997.
300

See id.

301

id.

302 See id.

The City Counsel President, Peter Vallone, contended that the

independent review board "is a way to insure that an honest cop at the bottom of the
totem pole, who wants to report corruption, has a place to go other than where the
corruption is occurring." Id.
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municipalities and eliminate personal liability of officers except in the
most egregious cases.

Tara L. Senkel

